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Abstract 
 
After a brief inspection of some actual cases where people apparently “mis-
identify” others, we draw some initial and tentative conclusions about ways of 
thinking about “who people are”. We then move on to look at underlying 
assumptions in psychology about this very question; with these assumptions 
considered under the rubric of psychology’s “model of being human”. Locating 
problems with this model on the basis of its affinity with Kantian thought, we 
conclude that what it misses is an understanding of cultural order as the primary 
medium for human existence. 
 
Against this, we propose instead — via Harvey Sacks in particular and 
ethnomethodological thinking generally — that to be in the world is always to be 
in the cultural world. Consequently, what persons can do and be is never a form 
of governance or control by fixed rules; rather it is always already an orientation 
to publicly-known and material forms of cultural order. We end by speculating on 
the general consequences of such a re-formulated “model of being human” for a 
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Introduction: therapy and voices 
Let us begin with an example from Harvey Sacks’s data taken from a group 
therapy session. Here, some teenage boys are discussing a number of things 
including drag racing and each other’s personalities:1 
 
 Roger:  Ken, face it you're a poor little rich kid. 
 (  ):  ((cough)) 
 Ken:  Yes Mommy. // Thank you. 
 Roger:  Face the music 
 (p. 420) 
What this shows, for Sacks, is that a correspondence theory of naming cannot 
cover all possible instances of how people go about identifying themselves and 
others. Roger is clearly not Ken’s mother, but still: “who it is that’s being 
addressed by ‘Yes Mommy’ is understood by the Members, and they may well 
seem to have some way, apart from correspondence correctness, to determine that 
someone is being referred to by a membership category” (p. 418). The key to 
finding how it is that “Mommy” is referring to Roger turns on questions of 
conversational sequencing as a form of cultural order (as opposed to formal 
correspondence). That is, “face it you're a poor little rich kid” is produced by 
Roger as an insult and, in cases of an insult being issued in a first conversational 
slot, only a small number of possible utterances can be expected in the second, 
following, slot. And in fact, the most likely second (or “return”) is a counter-
insult. As Sacks puts it: 
 
Insults come in pairs. To a first, a second may be returned. We can 
get at that in a fairly decent way, in that, for one, even if we’re 
uncertain as to the fact that the first was an “insult”, there are a 
collection of “second insults”, i.e., locatable returns to insults. And 
misidentification[s] of kinship terms are, very regularly, just such 
things. (p. 419) 
 
 So what we have to do (as analysts or as co-participants), in order to find 
Roger as designated by “Mommy”, is attend to the cultural rules for the practice 
of insulting: that is, to such things as “insults come in pairs” and “return insults 
can use kinship misidentifications”. Who people “are” then (or in standard 
psychological terms, what their “social identity” or “self-categorisation” may be) 
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is not a matter of applying universal correspondence-based references (such as 
“schizophrenic”, “extrovert” or “mother”). Rather, it is a matter of the local 
application of a cultural (as opposed to an intra-psychic) order or, as Sacks 
sometimes calls it, an “apparatus” or “machinery”.2 
 That such a cultural order is significant for psychology is made amply clear in 
the field of discursive psychology where the application of apparently fixed and 
universal category names (e.g., clinical terminology) has been shown to be, 
equally, an effect of, and hence subject to, such a culturally commonsensical 
order, as opposed to being a matter of (“scientifically verifiable”) correspondence 
between “names” and “clinical types” (see, for example, Palmer, 2000). 
 Whereas the group therapy extract from Sacks’s work examined above could 
be taken as referring to matters of social rather than psychological (dis)order, 
there are now numerous studies that have moved such analyses into the 
heartland of psychology.3 A case in point is offered by Leudar and Thomas (2000) 
in their investigations of the phenomenon of “hearing voices”: the question of 
“auditory hallucinations” (as the pathognomic indicator of the archetypal “mental 
illness”, schizophrenia) being both clinical psychology’s and psychiatry’s sine qua 
non. In mainstream psychological thinking, that is, hearing voices is routinely 
assumed to be exclusively something “in the head” rather than, as Leudar and 
Thomas take it to be (following Sacks), a question of local practices instantiating 
cultural membership. So instead of assuming static categories of “voice hearers” 
and “auditory hallucinations”, their inspection of clinical interview transcripts 
(among other mundane materials) shows how locally occasioned the 
phenomenon is. But still, and by virtue of being locally occasioned, the 
production of the phenomenon in talk turns out to be subject to quite ordinary 
forms of generally available cultural machinery based in a collection of “local 
concepts” equally available to clinicians and their “patients”, the “voice hearers”. 
 For example, in one transcript, a “patient” reports as follows: 
 
NJ: ... my son said to me “Dad wouldn’t have been impressed 
with this would he?” (0.35) and I heard him say (0.29) “No, I 
wouldn’t’”. 
(Leudar and Thomas, 2000, p. 190) 
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Just as with the use of “Mommy” in Sacks’s transcript, we can note here that some 
figure called “Dad” is manifestly not present in the conversation between NJ and 
her son. In fact, “Dad”, the father/husband is deceased. Nevertheless, his “turn” 
(“No, I wouldn’t”) is perfectly understandable as an appropriate second part for 
an overhearing participant on hearing themselves addressed in a first part (“Dad 
wouldn’t have been impressed with this would he?”). The reconstructed 
conversation makes perfectly good sense and is far from being an event whose 
understanding requires (specialist) forms of knowledge over and above the order 
of everyday sense making: 
 
A: Dad wouldn’t have been impressed with this would he? 
B: No, I wouldn’t 
Hence Leudar and Thomas’s conclusion: 
 
The timeless and universal question “what is hearing voices? 
period” is therefore not a happy one — it impoverishes the 
phenomenon studied. It impoverishes it because it treats as 
incidental and unimportant its context-contingent aspects. In 
psychology, which aims at biological and evolutionary 
explanations of mind, the timeless question implies there is a basic, 
raw experience of hearing voices.... This position is clearly not 
supported by the materials we have provided with this book. As 
there are no mechanical behaviours (except in abstractions) which 
become intentional conduct when combined with psychological 
phenomena, so there are no raw experiences which become 
meaningful under descriptions but can be lived without them.... So 
the general conclusion is really that local concepts are constitutive 
of local experiences and there cannot be a psychology or psychiatry 
which can do without them. (Leudar and Thomas, 2000, p. 209) 
 So “to be a (particular type of) person” is highly eventally specific. How is it 
possible that the locally specific could be of use for (meta)psychology? Can it, that 
is, have a more general status beyond what “scientific” psychology would 
construe as “merely anecdotal” on the grounds that local events are unsubjectable 
to the formal methodologies of “proper” sampling, testing, aggregation and 
proof? To some extent, we already have an answer to this question because, as we 
have seen, for both Sacks and discursive psychology, the locally specific is always 
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an instance of socio-cultural order. Why is such a version of “being human” 
relevant for psychological thinking generally? 
 
Psychology and “being human” 
Each of the human sciences carries with it, implicitly or explicitly, fundamental 
assumptions about what it is to be a human being. As with Lakatos’s (1978) idea 
of each natural science having a “hard core” of unquestionable assumptions 
(usually assumptions about the very nature of nature), on the basis of which 
empirical investigations can be/are carried out, so the human sciences, too, have 
their fundamental tenets. What would some of these be in psychology? What does 
psychology fundamentally assume it is to be human? 
 Let us propose what is perhaps a rather bold hypothesis: that for all the 
differences between the many and various schools of psychology, there is a single 
“model of being human” in operation, albeit with distinct (and sometimes 
seemingly incommensurate) tensions. In particular, we think there may be two 
general tensions of this model which we will call, for the want of better terms, its 
cognitive and the behavioural versions. 
 It is important to emphasise, from the outset of our argument, that we are by 
no means saying that there are only two basic schools of psychology. Rather, what 
we are saying is that contemporary psychology behaves as if it currently has 
available to it only two sets of fundamental assumptions about the basic 
conditions of being human. Accordingly, we are using the terms “cognitive” and 
“behavioural” in their essentially theoretical, meta-psychological, or perhaps even 
philosophical, senses. Another way of putting this would be to say that there are 
only two psychologies in the philosophical sense of the term “psychology”. Here 
“psychology” would not refer to an extant discipline and/or its empirical 
procedures so much as to a set of a priori assumptions about “the ground of a 
relation to beings” (Heidegger, 1992, p. 99) — on which see the short discussion at 
the end of this paper.4 
 It is also important to note that, in the following exegesis (deliberately sketchy 
and tendentious as it is) we will refer to extreme cases of what our shorthand 
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refers to here as the “cognitive” and “behavioural” model(s) — knowing from the 
outset that they share fundamental assumptions vis-à-vis what it is to be human 
and that, in this respect, they are philosophically (or meta-psychologically) 
cognate, if not identical. To show this identity in extremis, and while we recognise 
that many proponents of each position may take issue, we will use innatism (or 
“nativism”) as the strongest possible exemplar of the cognitive model and a 
qualified Skinnerianism as its behavioural counterpart. If such polarised cases can 
be shown to share fundamental assumptions — as Potter (2000) has also argued 
— then a fortiori for the various (and common) “rapprochements” between the 
models, perhaps best exemplified inter alia by notions such as “cognitive 
behavioural therapy” or Lewin’s (1951) famous formula: B = ƒ(PE).5 
 According to an extreme cognitive model, to be human is to have wired-in, 
innate capacities prior to action and experience; capacities subsequently deployed 
in specific empirical situations and circumstances as understandings of and 
actions in those situations and circumstances. In many sub-versions of the 
cognitive model, moreover, these innate capacities are taken to be universal 
(distributed identically through the human species), to work automatically or 
unconsciously, and to be, as a consequence, beyond the control of their human 
vehicles. A direct example would be Chomskyan psycholinguistics which, as we 
note below, asserts the existence of an innate human capacity for language 
acquisition prior to (and generative of) actually-occurring natural language-use. 
But moving to a more “social” or “cultural” case in point: even where, as in Self-
Categorisation Theory (SCT), analysts working within the cognitive model 
attempt to allow for situational specifics, they nevertheless end up privileging 
pre-given mental mechanisms: 
 
the functioning of the social self-concept is situation specific: particular 
self-concepts tend to be activated (“switched on”) in specific situations, 
producing specific self-images ... as a function of the interaction between 
the characteristics of the perceiver and the situation. (Turner et al, 1987, p. 
44) 
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This leaves SCT and its ilk with a highly mechanistic and intendedly 
“depersonalised” version of human identity — a version that we will later 
describe as “cultural dopism”: 
 
A “salient” identity is one that is currently psychologically active, 
determining self-perception at a given moment.... [I]ndividuals acting in 
terms of shared social identity are in effect not individuals but 
depersonalised. (Turner and Oakes, 1997, p. 364)6 
 By contrast, the behavioural model — as we are calling it — starts out with 
specific situations and circumstances as they arise empirically. It then assumes 
that responses to these stimuli by human organisms give rise to patterns or 
structures that, in turn (and with modifications arising from further sensations 
and experiences), produce such things as “understanding” (although strict 
behaviourists would of course eschew such a mentalist term) and “acting” in 
further environments. The model is, by and large, organicist and, as such, implies 
that human control of situations and circumstances is less important a 
determinant of behaviour than those environments themselves. An instance of 
this model is offered by Barker’s (1968, p. 17) account of “behavior settings” 
which he defines as: “stable, extra-individual units with great coercive power 
over the behavior that occurs within them”. An alternative account of this 
position is summed up in Milgram’s (1974, p. 205) observation: “It is not so much 
the kind of person a man is, as the kind of situation in which he finds himself 
[that] determines how he will act”. 
 A little further inspection, however, shows that these two positions (as with 
many antitheses) can be read as offshoots of a single underlying model of how 
things stand with being human. Fundamentally, both are deterministic and 
organicist in their own ways: to be human, on both accounts, is to be governed; 
either by cognitive “wiring” or by brute environmental factors. Accordingly, both 
positions propose a distinction between, on the one hand, experiences and 
circumstances and, on the other, patterns and structures. For both models, the two 
are directly connected — with one of them acting as an a priori ground that 
effectively determines the other.7 The difference, then, is effectively a matter of the 
 
Cultural model, page 7 
side of the binary one prioritises, takes as most fundamental and, for purposes of 
empirical investigation, starts with as given (or takes for granted). 
 
Assumptions about “being human” 
In this section of the paper, we note a number of problems (again in the 
philosophical sense) with the limits imposed by the range of possibilities for 
“being human” in psychology today (as sketched above). The first of these has to 
do with the model’s ancestry. That is, it can be taken as a “scientific” re-working 
of Kant’s sensual-moral picture of being human; with “behaviour” as the scientific 
proxy for the sensual and “cognition” as its moral counterpart. Let us, then, 
expand upon these affinities. 
 The Kantian view is complex but, for our purposes, can be summarised 
relatively simply. Kant realised that the whole philosophical tradition from Plato 
to Descartes — since it took “man” to be unique by virtue of being the “rational 
animal” — contained a paradox.8 The paradox was this: if rational, then how also 
animal, and vice versa? How could one be both a spiritual and intellectual being 
(a being of pure mind and reflection) and, at the same time, a fleshly organism, 
driven (as Kant thought) by the bodily senses and their tendencies towards 
pleasures and corruption? 
 The purely intellectual side of our being, he postulated, strives towards 
perfection, to knowing the suprasensory world in its absolute purity. But 
suprasensory things-in-themselves are unavailable to human thought. And this is 
because we are incarnate: our access to them is always effectively veiled by the 
flesh, the body and its dependence on its several senses. Pure noumena, which we 
would ideally attain were we disembodied spirits, are only mediately accessible 
to us as empirical and worldly phenomena. Our condition is, as the empiricists 
before Kant well knew, one of confinement to experience: experience must always 
precede knowledge. Kant completely accepted this — even to the point where he 
can be read as, at root, an empiricist himself. However, being deeply religious and 
spiritual, he also knew that this basic condition of “man” was, in the more 
universal scheme of things, corrupt and imperfect. It only described “man’s” 
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worldly and sensuous condition, leaving his striving for perfectibility out of 
account. If the strictly empiricist picture of human being stood alone, then, for 
Kant, we could legitimately mire ourselves in worldly pleasure, at the end of 
which our bodies would simply decay. Since Kant held strong ethical objections 
to this view — even though he could by no means deny the cogency of believing 
that knowledge derives from experience — he had to subscribe equally and 
simultaneously to a fundamentally rational view of man. Without it, the 
suprasensuous world of the spirit would be an impossibility. 
 But to hold both views is a paradox; an untenable position by any 
philosophical standard. Therefore Kant had to postulate a means of connecting 
the two. He had to find an underlying picture of being human — as it were 
“deeper” than the antinomy between the practical and the pure self — that could, 
without paradox, ground the two. This is the great work of Kant’s three critiques. 
The first of these discusses pure reason (the ur-form, perhaps, of cognitive 
models); the second practical reason (its ur-behavioural counterpart). However, 
the third critique, the Critique of Judgement (1952), puts forward a means of 
reconciling the first two. Cutting a long story short, the reconciliation of the 
antinomy makes each of its sides a set of checks and balances on the other. The 
capacity to perform such an equilibrium is the capacity for judgement. We can 
best summarise this latter capacity by turning to one of Kant’s final works, his 
Anthropology. Kant writes there: 
 
The two kinds of good, the physical and the moral, cannot be 
mixed together, because they would then neutralize each other and 
have no effect on the purpose of true bliss. Rather, inclination to 
pleasurable living and inclination to virtue are in conflict with each 
other, and the restriction of the principle of physical good by the 
principle of moral good constitute through their very conflict the 
whole purpose of a well-bred, partly sensuous and partly ethico-
intellectual human being. (1978, p. 185, our emphasis) 
Note Kant’s exact terms — “a ... partly sensuous and partly ethico-intellectual 
human being” — which is strikingly redolent of Lewin’s B = ƒ(PE), if some one-
and-a-half centuries earlier. The virtuous person, then, is not he who can resolve 
this conflict between his ethico-intellectual capacities and his sensuous 
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inclinations; for the conflict is irresolvable. Rather, the virtuous person is he who 
properly manages this conflict on a day-to-day basis and is, therefore, able to lead 
a harmonious life. The Kantian notion of the purpose of well-bred persons’ being-
in-the-world as the achievement of virtuous personhood and harmony by the 
balancing of these competing desires would seem to have a clear affinity with 
both historical (cf. the arbitration of conflict between ego and id by the superego) 
and contemporary psychological ones (cf. the increasingly shrill pronouncements 
from the psychotherapeutic and self-help industries of the necessity for the 
achievement or maintenance of “normality”, “self-actualisation” and “mental 
health”) — not to mention the penetration into both everyday and juridical talk of 
the idea that for the mind to be “unbalanced” is, in essence, to place its owner 
outwith the moral order. 
 The underlying problem with this picture is not simply its location in a 
tradition of spirituality but, more to the point, the fact that, as Hunter (1994) has 
shown, it is not so much a pure philosophy or theory of “man” as a set of quite 
practical asceses: spiritual exercises or “techniques of the self” (Foucault, 1986, 
1988). That is, the Kantian “picture” — arguably a template for psychology’s 
cognitive-behavioural model of being human — is not ineffective; rather it has 
quite concrete effects. Ultimately, it is not so much a set of neutral ideas about 
“man” as it is a definite means of actually producing persons in particular, and 
sometimes quite pernicious, ways. Pernicious, because this “man” that Foucault 
(1970) calls “the empirico-transcendental doublet” is forever anxious. Anxiety is 
his condition because, as Kant himself puts it, the empirical and the 
transcendental side of his being “cannot be mixed together, because they would 
then neutralize each other” — there can be no resolution only a precarious 
management or equilibration of the two. To have both at once, resolved to an 
impossible singularity, would be to have nothing, to be nothing. Modern “man”, 
then is either fundamentally anxious about living an antinomic life or else (should 
he give up on modernity’s unsatisfiable quest for a singular and harmonious 
identity — which, under any other circumstances would no doubt be a 
completely rational and viable option) he must surrender to becoming nothing. 
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 No doubt this terrible condition will be recognisable by today’s practitioners 
of the psy-complex (see Rose, 1990) — and while the psy-complex rarely, if ever, 
formulates this condition in explicitly moral terms, we must now at least suspect 
that this, morality, is what lies beneath its veneer of scientificity. So we hear that 
the patient’s life is “out of balance” and has to be returned to stasis and harmony. 
He or she has to come to be able to “accept themselves”, to “live with 
themselves”, to “forgive themselves”, and so forth, down through a long list of 
synonyms for Kantian equilibration. Anxiety and “identity crises” have to be 
“cured” so that the patient can lead a “normal” life. The clinician can choose to 
work either from the patient’s behaviour (actual life practices) in order to 
“resolve” their deeper cognitive “imbalance”, or else work with their “intellect” 
(via “cognitive therapy”, for example) towards restoring them to their 
(supposedly) former “functional” existence. 
 This is what we are seeing in cases of, for example, depression: the patient 
reports an inability to work, to think, to eat, to get out of bed in the morning, to 
take care of themselves; they report having lost interest in sex, and so forth. What 
Kant calls the physical good has become bad. The basic therapeutic assumption is, 
then, that Kant’s moral good (the patient’s “normal” mental state) has become 
equally bad — though which has caused which will depend on whether the 
therapist works with the cognitive or the behavioural emphasis of the model. A 
vast range of techniques can then be brought to bear; either on the physical body 
of the patient or on his/her moral-cognitive condition: breathing techniques, 
psychotropic drugs (which strangely assume brain chemistry to be the seat of 
morality), talking cures of all sorts, the recommendation of regimes of exercise, 
meditation tapes, “bibliotherapy”, ECT or Electro-shock Therapy (which even 
more strangely assumes that the destruction of the brain causes the destruction of 
moral conditions), and so forth, again, down through a very long list of 
techniques of the self. The Kantian-modern basis of psychology — which, we 
suspect, has been the essential foundation of its thought and practice since its 
inception in the 19th century — is no neutral or “merely theoretical” basis at all; it 
is, to be sure, theoretical, but by that we must now mean that it grounds 
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psychology’s self-appointed, impossible and unsatisfiable task: to overcome an 
anxiety that is always and already built into to its own version of modern “man”. 
This anxiety is much more basic and general than can be found in any particular 
clinical condition since it must apply, equally, to “normally” functioning and 
thinking human beings. 
 This is our first problem with the cognitive-behavioural grounds of 
psychology’s model of being human. Our second is, while somewhat less 
trenchant, more pragmatic and leads us to propose an alternative grounded on a 
quite unique conception of culture. Let us propose, then, that both the cognitive 
and behavioural models of being human are, as we will put it, “aggregationist”. 
Both versions, that is, and therefore their combination as psychology, work with 
the assumption that persons and their psychological processes, as well as the 
environments or situations in which they operate, are made up of component 
parts (structures of cognition, individual experiences, brains, stimuli, events, 
activities, behaviours, schemas, fragments of speech, and so on). So Kant sets the 
pace by breaking up being human into macro components (pure, practical and 
judging reason) and psychology follows by, firstly, transforming these (into 
cognition, behaviour and therapy respectively) and, secondly, by reducing each to 
further micro components. These individual micro components can then be 
aggregated, very frequently by statistical techniques, to form, for example, 
“norms” against which such things as “behaviours” and “mental capacities” can 
apparently be measured.9 As we have just seen, fundamental to managing the 
Kantian (im)balance is an idea of norms and normality: an ideal but unattainable 
equilibrium (“a normal healthy life”, for example) to which psychological practice 
is oriented. But of course, these statistical norms are, in fact, by no means recipes 
for psychological harmony and equilibrium; rather they are mere demographic 
averages (and the like), abstractions derived from populations which, in post-
Kantian modernity, must be essentially (rather than merely “clinically”) anxious. 
 But what if being human were not an aggregation of “factors”? What if it had 
a fundamentally different and distinct ontological status from things like the 
wind, neutron stars and capybaras? What, that is, if it were so utterly different — 
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qualitatively — from such things that it could not be thought of as aggregable and 
so could not be analysed (in the sense of disaggregation) under any 
circumstances? 
 
Sacks and culture 
As we have already seen from our initial examples, Sacks and those following 
him have begun to work with assumptions that are fundamentally distinct from 
aggregationism. Can we now say, more explicitly, exactly what these assumptions 
are and how they work in the face of mainstream psychological thinking about 
being human? Sacks’s fundamental assumption is that, in a primary sense, to be 
human is to be a cultural being. But he has a unique take on the question of what 
culture is that moves us outwith mere anthropology or, worse, cultural studies 
(both of which, we suspect, remain well within the Kantian camp). 
 In the Introduction to Sacks’s Lectures (1992; see note 1), Schegloff puts the 
matter especially well and, for our purposes here, very relevantly; for he pits 
Sacks’s position directly against the cognitive and behavioural models, albeit via 
examples that are somewhat peripheral to psychology itself. Schegloff (p. xlvi) 
notes that Sacks begins by wondering how it is that people actually come to be 
cultural beings; he opens up the question of cultural acquisition via the closely-
related question of language acquisition. That is, he begins by wondering how it 
can be that: 
 
any Member encountering from his infancy a very small portion of 
it [his or her culture], and a random portion in a way (the parents 
he happens to have, the experiences that he happens to have, the 
vocabulary that happens to be thrown at him in whatever sentences 
he happens to get) comes out in many ways pretty much like 
everybody else, and able to deal with pretty much anyone else (p. 
485). 
Sacks immediately rejects any aggregationist account of this remarkable fact of 
enculturation processes. For how such matters of enculturation come to take place 
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An alternative to the possibility that order manifests itself at an 
aggregate level and is statistical in character is what he [Sacks] 
terms the “order at all points” view [(p. 484)]. This view, rather like 
the “holographic” model of information distribution, understands 
order not to be present only at aggregate levels and therefore 
subject to an overall differential distribution, but to be present in 
detail on a case by case, environment by environment basis. A 
culture is not then to be found by aggregating all of its venues; it is 
substantially present in each of its venues (p. xlvi). 
 Accordingly, a novice member of a culture can discover all sorts of matters 
about that to which he or she belongs by working from very few experiences of it. 
The experiences do not aggregate (as on behavioural theories) and, yet, neither, 
for Sacks, need we postulate deep cognitive structures that, as it were, are 
embedded in the member (via his or her species being) and which simply have to 
be realised as the empirical particulars of the culture he or she happens to belong 
to as a matter of historical contingency. Schegloff notes in particular the contrast 
between the “order at all points” model and the innatist model, taking Chomsky 
as his example: 
 
In such a view [“order at all points”], one might conjecture, we 
have one, and perhaps the major, theoretically available alternative 
to Chomsky’s argument that, given the highly limited and 
“degenerate” sample of language to which first language learners 
are exposed, most of language — the crucial part — must certainly 
be innate; they surely could not be induced from the available 
“inputs” (p. xlvii). 
And, of course, “induction from the inputs” (read, for example, stimuli emanating 
from the environment) is a succinct gloss on the behavioural model. So what’s 
being argued here is that Sacks has an original take on culture (via enculturation) 
that obviates both “innate ideas” and “induction from the inputs”. The obviation 
makes Sacks’s position completely and utterly distinct from both the cognitive 
and behavioural models (and/or the “cognitive-behavioural” model).10 Instead, 
as with holographs — and this has important implications for such things as the 
“sampling” and “reliability” of “data” in psychology (McHoul and Rapley, 2000) 
— cultures have a special ontological status: any fragment of them displays the 
same fundamental order as any other and, indeed, as any “whole” that the 
fragments might compose. 
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 So, for Sacks, the alternative to the aggregationism required by the cognitive-
behavioural model of being human is, as Schegloff puts it: 
 
to consider a culture — and language as one component of culture 
— to be organized on the basis of “order at all points”. If culture 
were built that way, then socialization and language acquisition 
might well be designed accordingly, and require induction [in its 
socialisational rather than its methodological sense] from just the 
“limited” environments to which the “inductee” is exposed (p. 
xlvii). 
Schegloff then quotes Sacks: “given that for a member encountering a very limited 
environment, he has to be able to do that [i.e., grasp the order] ... things are so 
arranged as to permit him to” (p. 485). 
 The way in which we read Sacks’s view as radical is that it has the following 
implication: there is a counter-aggregationalist model of being human that stands 
completely outside the cognitive-behavioural model. On this alternative account, 
we are always and already cultural, in Sacks’s unique sense. If we are, to use 
Schegloff’s metaphor, “holographic”, then the Kantian bifurcation cannot hold as 
a “deep” description of our being. Kantian “man” becomes, effectively, an 
“historically adventitious” (p. 484) story we have been telling ourselves about 
ourselves — albeit for such a long time that it appears natural but such that, with 
Foucault (1970, p. 387), we could speculate that, one day, it will “be erased, like a 
face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea”. Sacks’s radical breakthrough is to have 
found (and to have founded) a new description of what “being human” is. This is 
shown most clearly by a concomitant of the “order at all points” theory: the 
reflexive relation of produceability and recognisability as a condition for cultural 
action. 
 By “produce” and “production” we mean the ways in which cultural members 
go about constructing such things as insults, armchairs and death. By “recognise” 
and “recognition”, we are not referring to a mental process; on the contrary, we 
mean the ways in which such members go about publicly co-producing them as 
insults, armchairs and death. Another way of putting this, using Garfinkel’s 
(1967) terminology, is to say that members’ cultural activities are “accountable”: 
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that is, they are produced and recognised (co-produced) in ways that make them 
audibly and visibly (that is, “accountably”) what they are, and not something else. 
 To prefigure our later example: one cannot be performing the culturally 
produceable-and-recognisable action called “waiting for a bus” simply by placing 
one’s body in a particular location, at a bus stop. To “wait for a bus” accountably 
— that is, describably — one has to perform a broad range of activities, in that 
place, at a bus stop, that are pertinent to that cultural practice, such that anyone 
looking and listening can see and hear that it is just that that one is doing — for 
example, because they may have an interest in “not jumping the queue” (an 
interest which is rendered irrelevant if one is not “waiting for a bus” but, say, 
“collecting used aluminium cans from a bus shelter”). If this holds for such 
mundane events, then, as numerous studies in discursive psychology have 
shown,11 it holds equally for “having a memory”, “forgetting”, “having a mental 
illness” and the rest of psychology’s stock in trade — where these are now to be 
construed as public practices rather than as private states or events. 
 The significance of this can be seen in the following way. If we can and have to 
recognise cultural “objects” as what they are for us, in this culture (again, for 
example, as conversations, games of football, operas and so on), then we also can 
and have to produce them in that way. This seems straightforward enough, but 
what deeper aspects of our cultural being-in-the-world does it demonstrate?12 For 
one thing, it clearly implies that, while cultures may display “order at all points”, 
this does not mean that members of them simply, as it were, “inspect” some 
common list of orderings (for example, a list held as a set of cognitive structures 
or as patterns derived from environmental stimuli) and, by matching them 
against what happens to be going on around them, thereby make sense of cultural 
events and activities. In short, cultural meanings cannot be read off against 
putative “rules”.13 “Order at all points” does not mean that cultural members are 
(as on the cognitive-behavioural model) passive “vehicles” for anonymous 
psycho-cultural structures. Instead, they are as much active producers of cultural 
order as they are active recognisers of it. Lacking this insight, of course, cognitive-
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behavioural accounts are prone to casting members as “cultural dopes” 
(Garfinkel, 1967). 
 This then opens up a quite distinct and unique question at the centre of what it 
is to have cultural being, or to be a cultural being. The question is: how are the 
production and recognition of cultural activities and events related? This question 
can lead us to a distinct view of how cultural orders are actively made by their 
members; and such that the procedures, techniques, methods or abilities that 
constitute that “how” could come to be psychology’s proper object, were it to 
embrace a Sacksian position. 
 Sacks’s answer to the production-recognition question (or, as he puts it, the 
generation-detection question) is startlingly simple at first sight: 
 
A culture is an apparatus for generating recognizable actions; if the 
same procedures are used for generating as for detecting, that is as 
simple a solution to the problem of recognizability as is formulable 
(p. 226; p. xxxvi). 
To put this another way: the relation between how we produce and how we 
recognise cultural actions is reflexive — each reflexively constitutes the other. 
And we have seen this in action in our first example: Ken produces “Mommy” as 
an insult (rather than as a sheer misidentification, for example) and that is 
precisely how Roger recognises it; and, reflexively, Ken’s first turn is dependent 
on Roger’s second (the counter-insult) for it to have been hearable as “an insult” 
all along. As Schegloff (p. xxxvi) notes, Sacks’s position on this matter may well 
derive from Garfinkel’s “central recommendation” for ethnomethodological 
studies. That recommendation is that: 
 
the activities whereby members produce and manage settings of 
organized everyday affairs are identical with members’ procedures 
for making those settings “accountable”.... When I speak of 
accountable my interests are directed to such matters as the 
following. I mean observable-and-reportable, i.e., available to 
members as situated practices of looking-and-telling. (1967, p. 1; 
our emphasis) 
The “identicality” noticed here is, later in Garfinkel, glossed as “reflexivity” and, 
since it carries with it the crucial co-conception of accountability (defined above), 
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we might say that cultural objects and/or events (unlike their supposedly 
“natural” counterparts) have the unique ontological status of being reflexively 
accountable (produceable and recognisable) and, moreover, that their orderliness 
is identical with this status. 
 A good instance, also prefigured above, of this reflexively produceable-
accountable status of members’ actions as socio-cultural order is outlined by 
Sharrock: 
 
Social order is easy to find because it’s put there to be found. When 
you go about your actions [...] you do them so that (or in ways that) 
other people can see what you’re doing. You do your actions to 
have them recognized as the actions that they are. When you stand 
at the bus stop, you stand in such a way that you can be seen to be 
waiting for a bus. People across the street can see what you’re 
doing, according to where and how you’re standing.... [Y]ou’re 
standing at a bus stop and somebody comes and stands next to you 
and they stand in such a way that eventually you can see that these 
people are standing in a line and that one person’s the first and 
another is the second, and some person’s at the end. People stand 
around at bus stops in ways they can be seen to be waiting for a 
bus. (1995, p. 4)14 
How it is that we perform the culturally-appropriate action of “waiting for a bus”, 
then, is radically different from merely standing at a bus stop. All such everyday 
cultural achievements can not sensibly be understood in terms of the relations 
between human organisms and their environments (a body under a shelter 
standing next to a sign reading “Bus Stop”); nor can they be understood in terms 
of fixed cognitive structures (an innate capacity for knowing how to queue, say). 
A machine or an animal could stand next to a bus stop and yet not, accountably, 
be seen to be doing the cultural action of “waiting for a bus”. And to imagine an 
innate capacity for queuing, we would have to invent something like an alien 
being. 
 When it comes to any particular human beings (or to being human in general), 
we simply don’t do, for example, “waiting for a bus” in either of those ways. And 
the way it turns out that we do in fact do it — i.e., accountably for a given cultural 
order — ought, on our reading, to be of absolutely critical interest to anything that 
calls itself “psych-ology”. 
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 For, to return briefly to Heidegger, the  (psuché) that psych-ology claims 
as its proper domain, while often translated as “mind” or “soul”, may better be 
thought via Heidegger’s (1992, p. 99) reading where  becomes “the ground 
of a relation to beings”. This may seem gratuitous — or, indeed, call (as all good 
conclusions should) for further investigation — but it is highly pertinent to what 
we have been arguing. Heidegger is asking the fundamental “psycho-logical” 
question of how beings relate; how (with respect to the human domain, then) 
sociality is at all possible. This relation, he posits, must have a ground of some 
kind; and what we have seen in the present paper is that at least one viable 
contender for that ground is the reflexively accountable (produceable and 
recognisable) character of everyday cultural action and talk. Accordingly 
reconfigured around a cultural “model of being human”, then, a psych-ology yet 
to come might be the study of the material ways in which persons come to be 
producable and recognisable as, for example, “hallucinators”, as “deluded” or, 





1. From here on, we will refer only to the first of the two volumes of Sacks’s 
Lectures (1992). For convenience, we simply note the relevant page number(s) in 
the reference brackets. References to Sacks’s text will therefore appear in Arabic 
numerals and to Schegloff’s commentary in Roman. For further discussion of the 
implications of Sacks’s position for psychology, see Edwards (1995). 
2. For a good introduction to Sacksian analysis and terminology, see Silverman 
(1998). 
3. Canonical instances would be Edwards (1997) and Edwards and Potter (1992) 
on “memory”; Antaki et al (1996) on “identity”; Wetherell and Potter (1992) on 
“attitudes”. 
4. An analogous case would be philosophical anthropology which, rather than 
having to do with empirical investigations of culture, refers to philosophical 
investigations of the grounds of daily life and experience. 
5. For Lewin, of course, “B” glossed “behaviour” — but in its most general sense 
as what persons do and are: “being” offers a gloss with which we might be more 
comfortable. The interactive binary that interests us here is the “PE” side of the 
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formula, glossing, as it does, “persons” and “environments” where the former is 
to be read via “character” and “cognition” and the latter via “kinds of situations” 
or “behaviour settings”. 
6. For an account of mainstream social-cognition research see Augoustinos and 
Walker (1995). For criticisms of this position, see Edwards (1997) and Potter 
(1996). On SCT specifically, see Edwards (1998). 
7. From this, it follows that we are not arguing here for a simplistic distinction 
between rationalism and empiricism at a meta-psychological level. Our thanks to 
James Wertsch for bringing out this point. 
8. Today, the term “man” is, of course, in disrepute for its gender-exclusionary 
connotations. We have no intention here of perpetuating such exclusions. We 
merely defer to a term which has had a quite particular meaning in philosophy 
since at least Descartes. One of the 20th century’s leading women philosophers 
Hannah Arendt (see Arendt, 1958) was, like many of her sisters in philosophy, 
equally prepared to risk connotations of gender exclusion for the sake of avoiding 
disciplinary inaccuracy and anachronism. Our discussion of Kant makes the term 
all but inevitable. 
9. A case in point would be the “discovery” of various syndromes and disorders 
such as OCD (obsessive-compulsive disorder) where, measured against a putative 
norm, frequencies of such things as washing one’s hands can be deemed 
abnormal. For an analysis of such matters, see Miller and McHoul (1998, pp. 122-
4). 
10. This is also what distances Sacks’s position from other “culturalist” forms of 
counter-psychology such as Bourdieu’s (1977) “theory of practice” and de 
Certeau’s (1984) theory of the “practice of everyday life”. As Wetherell (1998, pp. 
401) has pointed out, such theories wrongly assume that “Subject positions, and 
thus the identities of participants in social life, are determined by discourses and 
in this sense are prior, already constituted, and could be read off or predicted 
from knowledge of the relevant discourse”. She goes on to show how, as with 
mainstream psychology, these theories of the self “entail descriptive closure and 
cognitive consistency”. Our thanks to Jaan Valsiner for requesting this important 
distinction. 
11. The studies that confirm this are neatly summarised in Edwards and Potter 
(2001). 
12. On “being-in-the-world”, see Dreyfus (1991), and for its relevance to 
ethnomethodology, see McHoul (1998). 
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13. As is frequently pointed out in the literature on Sacks, he argues that 
members do not follow rules (as it were “slavishly”); where rules are concerned, 
members merely orient to them. See also, Edwards (1997) on script formulations 
and the rules of the road in Mexico City. 
14. To see that such matters are culturally specific, one only need try doing this in 
Rome where the techniques for “waiting for a bus” are an utterly different and 
more clandestine affair. 
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